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The End of Federalism in Telecommunication 
Regulations? 
Douglas C. Sicker* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 For most of the last century, only a few questioned the sacrosanct and sovereign 
role of states in telecommunications regulation.  In the wake of the 1996 Telecom Act1 
and the rise of the Internet, some commentators and policymakers are just starting to 
challenge this view, but none has emphasized how the changes in technology—as 
opposed to economics or policy—warrants such a re-examination.  By analyzing the 
changing nature of telecommunications networks themselves, this paper provides a 
further basis for re-thinking this out-dated regulatory model. 
¶2 This evolving debate asks what role states should play versus the federal 
government in regulating modern communications networks.2  The typical argument 
takes place, on one side, with those that believe deferring to the states leads to a disparate 
patchwork of laws not well suited to modern communications.  On the other side, there 
are those who believe that the regulatory authority should lie with the states, presumably 
closer to the people it affects.3  This debate is not new.  As far back as 1969, then-Circuit 
Judge, later Chief Justice, Burger showed strong support for federal preeminence in 
stating that: “Any other determination would tend to fragment the regulation of a 
communications activity which cannot be regulated on any realistic basis except by a 
central authority; fifty states and myriad local authorities cannot effectively deal with bits 
and pieces of what is really a unified system of communication.”4 
 
*  Douglas C. Sicker is an assistant professor in computer science and telecommunications at the 
University of Colorado at Boulder.  Prior to this, Professor Sicker served as Chief of the Network 
Technology Division of the Federal Communications Commission.  Professor Sicker would like to thank 
the following individuals for their assistance with this paper: Dale Hatfield, Phil Weiser, Patrick Ryan, Lisa 
Blumensaadt, Jon Peterson and Adam Peters.  An earlier version of this paper was published as a working 
paper at www.pff.org. 
1 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.  L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 18 and 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1996 Act].  The 1996 Act amends the Communications Act 
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et.  seq. 
2 See Roger G. Noll, Managing the Transition to Competition in Telecommunications (1986) 
(unpublished paper, on file with author) [hereinafter Noll].  See also AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM 
& TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 3-17 (Paul Teske ed., 1995). 
3 See generally AMERICAN REGULATORY FEDERALISM & TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE, 
supra note 2.  This simplifies a rather complex debate, which includes numerous arguments on both sides.  
It is not my intention to explore this debate, but rather to describe how technology is influencing one 
aspect. 
4 General Telephone Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969) 
(Burger, J.). 
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¶3 More recently, Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) Chairman Michael 
Powell echoed a similar perspective in a statement concerning the “Triennial Review” 
Order.  As Chairman Powell remarked, 
[t]he nation will now embark on 51 major state proceedings to evaluate 
what elements will be unbundled and made available to competitors.  
These decisions will be litigated through 51 different federal district 
courts.  These 51 cases will likely be decided in multiple ways – some 
upholding the state, some overturning the state and little chance of 
regulatory and legal harmony among them at the end of the day.5 
¶4 Thus, Powell signaled a new government era in telecommunications that embraced 
a traditional style of federalism in what was traditionally viewed as a national 
undertaking. 
¶5 However, no one within this debate has critically examined this issue with respect 
to the technical evolution of the network; nor have they considered the impact of these 
laws on the subsequent operations of the network.  While Noll points out that technical 
and economic distinction between federal and state jurisdictions are a fiction,6 in this 
paper I attempt to provide the analytical assessment to indicate the nature of that fiction.  
This paper articulates these issues and the trends associated with the evolution of 
technology and the associated network and service architectures.  While this paper 
focuses on technology, it is not my intention to trivialize the complex interplay of 
technology, economics, and policy.  Instead, I will demonstrate how technology is 
making traditional jurisdictional distinctions less tenable. 
¶6 This paper will focus upon six well-known technology trends that are influencing 
the evolution of the network: 
(1) the cost of  “communicating” is becoming more distance insensitive; 
(2) the networks and the services that ride on these networks are becoming more 
modular; 
(3) packet-routed networks are becoming more prevalent than circuit-switched 
networks; 
(4) the application (e.g., voice) is becoming more independent and separate from 
the network; 
(5) geographic boundaries are irrelevant to emerging technology; and, 
(6) intelligence and functions are migrating away from the central office (the 
delocalization of the central office). 
¶7 These trends are continuing to have a profound impact on the evolution of the 
network and especially the services and applications provided over these networks.  As I 
will later describe in detail, voice over packet service differs substantially from 
traditional voice service, and these differences are causing (and will continue to cause) 
substantial regulatory difficulty. 
 
5 In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 18 
F.C.C.R. 16,978, 17,519-20 (2003) (Chairman Powell approving in part and dissenting in part). 
6 See Noll, supra note 2. 
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¶8 Modern telecommunications networks are evolving in ways that render local and 
state authority over many telecommunications policy decisions less justifiable than they 
were in the past. There are a number of timely policy consequences that should be 
realized as the network continues to delocalize.  First, the standards applied to network 
elements continue to change primarily due to technical evolution.  For example, local 
switching and operator services can be done as cheaply and easily from out-of-state as 
from within.  Second, traditional economic regulations like tariff-based pricing and 
LATA-based pricing do not make sense in a VoIP world.  Simply put, modern networks 
(and the services offered over them) are delocalizing in design, operations, traffic and 
cost characteristics.7  Further, the benefits from a modernized network are undermined by 
policies that attempt to make a distinction between local and non-local aspects of the 
network, particularly as this relates to the services carried on these networks.8 
¶9 To analyze this issue, I examine the evolution of the Public Switched 
Telecommunications Network (“PSTN”), as well as the development of packet-based 
networks (including the Internet).9  To begin this examination, I consider the evolution of 
these networks’ design, operation, traffic, and cost characteristics.  The goal of this 
review is to understand the general evolution of these networks, with a particular focus 
on architecture, cost and operations.  I then examine how these characteristics have 
influenced (1) jurisdictional issues, (2) network configuration, and (3) network 
economics.  Through this analysis, I demonstrate that the historic rationales for local 
authority over telecommunications are much less valid today than in the early days of the 
PSTN.  Moreover, the persistence of traditional state/federal jurisdictional categories 
will, in fact, inhibit optimal network design.10  I also demonstrate why we should move 
away from a “dual federalism model” where states may clash with the federal 
government over a jurisdictional divide toward “cooperative federalism” where states 
may act as labs, within limits, and the federal government leads the policy directive.11  
Last, I demonstrate that a more deregulatory regime is appropriate, particularly as it 
relates to the technical evolution of the network.12 
 
7 The author specifically uses the term delocalizing (or delocalization) rather than decentralizing.  
Decentralized implies that the control of the service is distributed, whereas delocalized means that the 
control moves away from the user.  However, we see both decentralization and delocalization occurring in 
services such as VoIP. 
8 Even more artificial (and problematic) are the distinctions created by intralata and interlata 
designations, as well as the distinctions between intrastate and interstate, and arguably national versus 
international distinctions. 
9 It is important to recognize that the PSTN is evolving away from a circuit-switched model.  For 
example, access over DSL is based on packet architectures and long-distance services are now traveling 
over packet-routed networks.  Therefore, care must be taken to indicate what is meant when discussing the 
modern PSTN, since it is clearly not the circuit-switched network of yesteryear. 
10 While this paper focuses on the PSTN, a similar argument could be made for other networks (e.g., 
cable and wireless). 
11 See Philip Weiser, Cooperative Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 727, 
728-29 (2003). 
12 This paper does not assert that regulation is unnecessary; indeed, in several areas regulation (be that 
local, state, national and international) should continue to have a positive impact on consumer welfare. 
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II. THE HISTORIC TELEPHONE NETWORK 
¶10 The highly local and hierarchical nature of the early telephone network, with 
particular regard to its design and operation, went highly unchanged for decades.  This 
applies to its architecture, operations, traffic, and cost, as well as the influence of 
regulation on its evolution.  Arguably the service—voice—experienced no change 
whatsoever.  And while the technology (switching and transmission) evolved, there was 
minimal reflection in pricing because of the regulatory structures applied to this market. 
¶11 For most of the twentieth century, both the federal and state governments regulated 
the telephone network as a natural monopoly.13  The value of the network was in the 
number of subscribers and thus the ubiquity of service.14  Efficient pricing was 
sublimated to how many people could be reached on the network.  Thus, the notion of 
competitors overbuilding to reach current customers of the dominant provider was seen 
as redundant and a waste of capital.  Building out the dominant network added value, and 
the dominant provider had little economic or regulatory reason to interconnect with 
networks of other providers. 
¶12 As such, initial regulatory oversight consisted of rate-of-return or right-of-way 
regulation.  Under this model, dominant networks did not have an incentive to be 
efficient; to the contrary, the more they invested, the greater their return.15  At this early 
point in network development, it was sensible for states to be involved.  The design and 
traffic of the network was such that many of its elements had a local physical presence 
and served a clearly local function; i.e., carrying and controlling largely local traffic.  
This traffic stayed within a limited geographic area bounded traditionally by the 
community that the communications network served. 
¶13 As the network developed, the traffic became less local, and the intelligence and 
control of the network evolved in kind.  Today, the design of the network has progressed 
from relatively noncomplex switches that are hierarchically connected, where most all 
intelligence and control resided locally, to more complex switches that handle many more 
functions.  Ultimately, the modern network is designed so that much of the intelligence 
and control has migrated completely away from the local switch and instead into the 
network and network endpoints.  It is this delocalization of the network—including the 
migration of intelligence and control away from the local switch—that complicates the 
already present jurisdictional uncertainty problem. 
A. Network Operations and Design of the Historic Telephone Network 
¶14 As depicted in Figure 1 below, the PSTN had a star configuration in early networks 
with the central office at the center and the lines radiating out to the customers.  Here, the 
control and intelligence was localized at the central office.16  Thus, in the early days of 
 
13 Later, we will describe how this regulation has evolved through the antitrust process and the Modified 
Final Judgment (MFJ). 
14 See HANK BRANDS & EVAN T. LEO, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
CARRIERS (1999).  The technical economic description of this is that the telephone network exhibited 
positive network externalities. 
15 See id. 
16 See Michael Kende and Douglas Sicker, Real-time Services and the Fragmentation of the Internet, 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (2000). 
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telephony, when a customer placed a call, it was received at a local central office (also 
known as an end-office or later as a Class 5 office).17  Within the central office was the 
switch, whose role was to process the call based on logic that resided in the switch.18  In 
simple terms, a switch provided a connection (and subsequent disconnection) between the 
calling and called parties.19  Initially, this “switch” was a human that operated a patch 
panel to interconnect calls.20  When a call arrived at the central office, the operator would 
make a connection between the calling and the called party by physically plugging a cord 
between the two parties.21  The human operator was the intelligence of the network, 
providing information to the customer, as well as making the actual connection. 
However, as telephony grew in popularity, the task of making the connection eventually 
passed to electromechanical switches.22  These electromechanical switches were 
eventually replaced by subsequent generations of more modern switches.23 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Historic Telephone Network Star Architecture24 
¶15 The telephone network was based on a design where simple endpoints (i.e., 
telephones) would signal a limited amount of information (e.g., dialing, on-hook and off-
hook) to a relatively complex switch.25  The switch maintained the logic for completing a 
call, and later for services such as call forwarding, and for many other management and 
billing operations.  In other words, the switch was the intelligence of the PSTN. 
Regardless of the technology, the early switch maintained a pivotal role in the operation 
and services provided to the customer while the central office played the major role in the 
operations of the early telephone network. 
¶16 Several major technical advances altered the design and operation of the telephone 
network, including the advent of digital switching, the development of modern signaling 
 
17 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEMS (1990). 
18 This is not to imply that the switch is the only equipment within a central office; there are many other 
elements including distribution frames, cross connects, power supplies, optical equipment and so on. 
19 See BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRANSMISSION ENGINEERING, VOL. 
3 NETWORKS AND SERVICES (1990). 
20 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
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systems and the introduction of optical technology.  The advent of the digital switch 
drastically changed the basic operation of the PSTN.  With such changes, not only was 
the network controlled digitally, but the voice data was transferred digitally within the 
network.  However, the architecture was still circuit-switched, whereby the digital data 
was still carried over a dedicated circuit from end-to-end.26  Yet, the digitization of the 
network led to a more general-purpose computing platform, which provided the basis for 
subsequent advances.  In the late 1970s, American Telephone and Telegraph (“AT&T”) 
started to implement a new signaling and control technology, referred to as Common 
Channel Interoffice Signaling.27  This approach made use of a separate data network to 
transmit call routing, signaling and supervisory information among the toll offices.28  This 
technology eventually led to the now pervasive (packet-based) Signaling System 7 
(“SS7”) networks.29  In this regard, this technology delocalized the control and signaling 
of the network.  Finally, optical networks based on Synchronous Optical Network 
(“SONET”) technology provided a substantial improvement in the reliability of the 
network, both at the bit level, as well as in the ability of the network to recover from 
certain outages.30  This technology supported large quantities of calls with high reliability 
(and at an improved price point), thereby supporting the growth of long distance and data 
traffic. 
¶17 The legal rules governing the network served as a lagging indicator of the 
technological change.  Interestingly, this change took place as a common-law matter 
rather than through legislative action. Carterfone v. AT&T31 was pivotal in the 
modularization and delocalization of the network.  In Carterfone, the FCC invalidated 
AT&T’s restriction on the attachment of foreign equipment as unreasonable and 
unjustifiably discriminatory.32  After Carterfone, customers could purchase equipment 
from other manufacturers and attach it to AT&T’s network.  Thus, through an adversarial 
proceeding, the FCC broke the monopoly control that AT&T had over endpoint devices 
and created a new market that shifted some power from the local provider (almost 
invariably AT&T) to the customer and to other manufacturers.  This modularization of 
control allowed end devices to hold more intelligence and possess more features. 
¶18 Carterfone also led to strong competition in the PBX field.33  End users, such as 
large manufacturing and transportation companies, constructed extensive local (on-
premises) and long-distance private line networks using PBXs and leased lines or private 
microwave facilities.34  Like the old central office switches, these devices became 
increasingly computer-like and offered a host of services, such as abbreviated dialing, 
least-cost routing and a host of other services that were not always available on a central 
 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 A toll office can be thought of as simply a central office used for switching toll calls. 
29 Signaling System 7 defines the protocols used in call establishment, modification, teardown and 
management. 
30 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
31 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), 
reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). 
32 Id. at 423. 
33 A Private Branch Exchange (“PBX”) can be thought of as a telephone switch deployed on a 
customer’s premise. 
34 JONATHAN E. NEUCHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE (2005). 
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office (“CO”) switch.35  Some of the motivation for the long distance private line 
networks was to reduce long distance charges by avoiding access charges.36  Similar 
functionality could be provided through a CO-based solution, namely CENTREX (short 
for Central Exchange), and large private networks were created using leased switching 
services as well.37  At divestiture, AT&T and others offered PBX-based solutions.  The 
divested Bell Operating Companies (“BOCs”), however, fought back using CENTREX to 
compete.  This is a classic example of “where does the intelligence reside.”  It also 
demonstrates how divestiture facilitated—through separation, competition and falling 




Figure 2.  The Historic Telephone Network Hierarchy38 
¶19 The design of the early telephone network was based on a hierarchical architecture, 
where the need to rise up the hierarchy generally correlated to the distance of the call.  As 
depicted in Figure 2, the Class 5 office served to terminate the customer loop.  Customers 
served off of the same Class 5 switch were connected directly through that switch.  
However, customers served off of different Class 5 switches still needed to be connected.  
Since it would be impractical and inefficient to directly connect all of the switches across 
the country (as the traffic between these switches would not warrant the expense), these 
 
35 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
36 Each long distance telephone call you make includes per-minute fees that your long distance carrier 
pays to the originating and terminating local telephone companies over whose facilities that call also 
traveled.  Those fees, which are designed to recover the costs to local telephone companies for use of their 
facilities, are referred to as “access charges.”  Access charges—both state (intra-) and federal (inter-)—
were traditionally set by regulators to be above cost, thus artificially inflating the costs of inter- and intra-
state long distance.  As a general matter, these inflated charges were used to cross-subsidize below cost 
rates for rural and residential subscribers.  Despite being set above-cost and thus being uneconomic, they 
rates were set to allow local phone companies to recover regulatorily legitimized costs.  See 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Factsheets/ispfact.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
37 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
38 See BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, supra note 19. 
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switches relied on other switches higher up the hierarchy to provide the interconnection.39  
As a call progressed up the hierarchy, it would hit the Class 4 switch (the toll center).  If 
this switch could not provide a connection, the call would pass up the hierarchy to the 
Class 3 switch, and so on.  This approach was very practical, as most calls were local and 
the hierarchical design scaled well with network growth.  Local networks in large urban 
areas were sometimes based upon a two level hierarchy – with the end offices and local 
tandem(s) forming the two levels.  Large, flat-rate local calling areas meant that these 
two-level local networks handled considerable amounts of traffic.40 
¶20 Delocalization is not a recent phenomenon.  Even during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
network trended toward delocalization.  New switches were based on computer 
technology, which would support new network control models such as packet-based 
signaling systems.  These systems allowed the network to operate in a more efficient, 
coordinated and secure manner.  The operation of these packet-based signaling systems 
included the control and intelligence of completing a call.41  Thus, the intelligence and 
control, which formerly resided in the local switch, migrated into the network through the 
packet-based signaling systems.  This shift toward computer-based switches helped usher 
in the shift of control and intelligence into the network and away from the local switch. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The Historic Telephone Network (Post divestiture)42 
¶21 In addition to being shaped by legislation and administrative regulations, the 
telephone network has also been shaped by intervening federal antitrust actions.  In 1974, 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against AT&T for maintaining its 
monopoly power through anticompetitive conduct, in violation of the Sherman Act.43  
 
39 Some Class 5 switches were directly interconnected when traffic between the two warranted a 
dedicated connection. 
40 One of the interesting things that happened with the falling cost of transmission and the ability to 
build larger switches is the flattening of the hierarchical design of the network. 
41 Calls that originated and terminated on the same switch may not require this signaling system. 
42 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
43 See U.S. v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). 
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Trial eventually commenced in 1981 and ended with AT&T and the DOJ settling with the 
Modification of Final Judgment (“MFJ”) in 1982.44  Thus, the 1982 MFJ signaled the end 
of the telecommunications “natural monopoly” and led to the separation of the local 
network from the long-distance network, fueled the creation of the Local Access and 
Transport Areas (“LATA”)45 and prohibited the BOCs from provisioning long-distance 
service.46  LATAs defined the area in which the BOC could provide local services.47  
Points of Presence (“POPs”) were created by long-distance carriers as a point of 
interconnection to the Local Exchange Carrier (“LEC”), where they terminated and 
originated traffic to or from the LECs’ networks.48  The corresponding network point for 
the LEC is the Point of Interconnection (“POI”).  Due to equal access obligations, BOCs 
could not discriminate in favor of any particular long-distance carrier.49 50 51 
¶22 Divestiture dissolved the monolithic telephone system into a number of distinct and 
competitive business entities.52  The BOCs were now interested in the local operations, 
while AT&T (and the other long distance companies) sought to make long distance as 
attractive as possible by reducing previously artificially inflated rates.  The long distance 
providers paid the local service providers an access charge for calls carried over the local 
network.  With very high per-minute access charges, large companies were paying many 
times more than the cost of their loops to access the long-distance carriers.  Thus, there 
was a great amount of incentive to move that traffic to dedicated (non-switched) 
facilities, where there were no per-minute charges.  If dedicated facilities were provided 
by the local phone company, it was called service bypass; and if dedicated facilities were 
provided by another local carrier (called Alternative Local Transport Service Provider or 
Competitive Access Provider), it was called facilities bypass.  The threat of bypass from 
these two sources forced the local carriers’ per minute access charges down, with some of 
the loss in revenue being compensated for by an increase in end-user fixed monthly 
charges.  Interestingly, with the sharp drop in per-minute access charges, there was less 
need for large users to construct private line networks and much of that traffic migrated 
back to the PSTN as virtual private networks.  The marked decrease of the BOCs’ 
implicit local rate subsidy from interstate traffic pricing coupled with concurrent long-
distance competition drastically changed pricing and traffic characteristics, as described 
in detail in the following subsection. 
 
44 See AT&T Consent Decree, 1982 [Modification of Final Judgment, or MFJ.]  This agreement was 
termed such because it was considered a modification of the original 1956 decree terminating an antitrust 
action against Western Electric.  See also U.S. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company, 552 F. 
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) [court approval of MFJ].  See also U.S. v. AT&T, supra note 43. 
45 See U.S. v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983). 
46 See generally MFJ, supra note 44. 
47 See id. at § IV(G).  Most states were divided into several LATAs, but some were single-LATA states, 
and some LATAs crossed state boundaries. 
48 The service provided by the LECs to long-distance carriers is referred to as exchange access service 
and includes transport, switching and access functionality. 
49 See 1996 Act, supra note 1. 
50 Equal access also required dialing parity, where all carriers had one-touch dialing. 
51 See generally MFJ, supra note 44. 
52 Note that the CPE, inside wiring and long-distance segments were pushed to become competitive 
segments by FCC decisions prior to the MFJ.  However the MFJ made the long-distance and local 
segments’ interests much more polar as their operations were now completely separate business/financial 
entities. 
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¶23 The implication is that, just as the MFJ and previous regulation significantly 
influenced the architecture and evolution of the network at the time (by determining who 
connects and how), so will various state and federal regulation influence the technical 
evolution of the current (and future) network.  The MFJ’s clear effects on network design 
and operation confirm how the regulatory environment impacts the subsequent operations 
of the network.53 
B. Traffic and Cost Characteristics of the Historic Telephone Network 
¶24 We have already seen that traffic on the early telephone network was 
predominately local.  Flat rates on local calling encouraged the use and adoption of the 
local telephone service.  The network was designed to accommodate traffic patterns 
premised on local calling.  Indeed, the pricing reinforced the network use.  Low local flat 
rates encouraged local calling and thus promulgated a continued localized network 
design.  In contrast, long-distance rates remained high and were charged on a per-minute 
basis.  Consequently, long distance usage remained relatively low (particularly in the 
residential market).54  Therefore, the communications network needed comparatively 
little long-distance infrastructure compared to local infrastructure.  Artificially low cost 
local service and artificially high cost long distance (and business) service saw to that.55 
¶25 It is interesting to consider that a few decades ago, a long-distance call was 
generally considered as something special — worthy of the interruption.  Long-distance 
calls were once priced so that they were reserved for important business or somewhat of a 
luxury indulged in only occasionally by most customers.  However, today’s long-distance 
rates are readily affordable to most consumers and consequently, long-distance calls are a 
frequent occurrence.  Indeed, calling plans with “unlimited” long-distance calling (or 
large bundles of minutes) have made the cost differential between local and long-distance 
calls nearly irrelevant.56  This demonstrates the economic axiom that pricing greatly 
influences traffic, which in turn, shapes architecture and network evolution. 
¶26 As described by FCC statistics, while there was a steady growth in long-distance, it 
was not until the 1982 divestiture of the Bell System (and again after the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996) that long-distance growth increased substantially.57  
The old-school high cost of long-distance is well-understood as being the driving factor 
that suppressed demand.58  We have seen that it was not until the introduction of 
competition that rates fell sufficiently to stimulate demand.  The subsidy of local rates by 
 
53 It is worth mentioning the notion of the “essential facilities doctrine.”  Hausman and Sidak describe 
the scope and purpose of the essential facilities doctrine as follows: “The ‘essential facilities doctrine’ 
addresses scenarios in which a company owns a resource that other firms absolutely need to provide their 
own services.  Properly understood, the doctrine is a common-law rule concerning the obligation (if any) of 
a vertically integrated firm to sell an input to competitors in the downstream market.”  The Federal Courts 
applied the essential facilities doctrine in MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), just after the MFJ. 
54 It is important to recognize that while rates did fall for long-distance service pre-divestiture, it was not 
until after divestiture that we saw sufficient price decreases to stimulate substantial increase in use. 
55 These costs were artificial in that subsidies played a strong hand in determining the price of the 
service. 
56 See, e.g., the Neighborhood by MCI, http://www.theneighborhood.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
57 FCC data adapted from http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/lec.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
58 See Remarks of FCC, available at http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/chong/sprbc506.txt (last visited Apr. 
7, 2005). 
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long-distance and business charges complicated network traffic and cost characteristic.  
Flat-rate, low-cost local calling ostensibly spurred consumer adoption, however it also 
distorted the market because the subsidy structure obscured the true cost of consumers’ 
phone calls. 
¶27 Following divestiture and the concurrent decrease of subsidized local rates, there 
was a significant increase in both long-distance and local traffic and penetration rates.  
Based on FCC data, local usage increased twenty-five percent and long-distance 
increased over 100 percent during the four-year period following divestiture.  
Interestingly, this increase in local traffic occurred even though rates had increased. Also, 
contrary to state regulatory concerns at the time, local telephone penetration rates 
continued to increase.59 
C. Implications of PSTN Evolution 
¶28 Benefiting from close federal regulation on new entrants, pre-divestiture AT&T 
operated in a stable environment, where it could strictly control network evolution.  For 
the network, this resulted in fairly slow and steady progress, hallmarked by reliability and 
availability.60 
¶29 Considering the development of the early telephone network, it is easy to see how 
regulators made such a strong distinction between the local network and the long-distance 
network.  Aside from regulatory influence, there was a strong local nature to the 
network’s technology, design, operations and traffic patterns.  Recall that the design and 
technology were such that calls were locally controlled first through a human operator 
and later through an electromechanical switch.  Further, the traffic was also 
predominantly local, partly due to local subsidization by consumers who paid high long-
distance and business customers who paid even higher rates to keep local residential rates 
artificially low.  The policy to subsidize local rates had a substantial impact on 
maintaining the local and static nature of the U.S. telephony system.  While it might be 
argued that this approach served us well to establish a highly-deployed and highly-
reliable network, it is clear that the consequence was to minimize the use of long-
distance, keeping the network localized in that respect. 
¶30 In conclusion, the early telephone network had a local nature, particularly with 
respect to switching, services, operations, traffic and cost.  While the advent of 
divestiture resulted in a decrease in prices and an increase in volume of long-distance 
traffic, the local nature of the network remained substantially the same; particularly in 
terms of design (control, intelligence and service provision maintaining a physical local 
presence).61  However, with the introduction of new signaling technology, control and 
intelligence migrated away from the local switch and deeper into the network.  This 
migration away from the highly localized structure of the network marked the beginning 
of radical changes soon to come to the PSTN.  These changes included the introduction 
of the Intelligent Network (“IN”) and the merging of the PSTN with Internet Protocol 
 
59 See FCC Data, supra note 57. 
60 See Steffen Blaschke, The Organization of AT&T – A Historical Contingency Approach (2001), 
available at http://www.students.uni-marburg.de/~Blaschke/arbeit/ATT.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
61 As previously described, there was some migration of control and function toward the network edge 
through PBXs. 
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(“IP”)-based network(s).62  Thus, divestiture resulted in delocalization through the 
introduction of new players and through changes in costs and traffic patterns, while new 
technology resulted in delocalization by removing control from the local switch and 
bringing it deeper into the network and out into end-devices. 
III. THE PRESENT TELEPHONE NETWORK 
¶31 The introduction of new signaling systems and fiber technology predominated in 
the post-divestiture evolution of the PSTN.63  This new signaling system, Signaling 
System 7 (SS7), represented a substantial change in the operation of pre-divestiture 
telephone systems.  As indicated in Figure 4 below, control of resources shifted away 
from the local switch and into the signaling network.  Notably, the switch was now better 
able to communicate with other switches and devices for the completion of calls, rather 
than relying on the local switch to maintain all or most of the intelligence and control.  In 
the 1990s, the telephone carriers introduced an extension to the SS7, the Intelligent 
Network.64  The IN represented another significant change in how and where service and 
associated intelligence existed in the network.65  While the SS7 provided a means of 
querying other switches for the connection and management of calls, the IN provided the 
intelligence necessary to make novel (and profitable) services available to customers, 
such as 800 service (free to caller), calling card services and voicemail.66 
 
 
Figure 4.  A Simplified View of the Present Telephone Network67 
 
62 See NEUCHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 34. 
63 Various, and nearly simultaneous, technical improvements have driven the decrease in 
communications costs, including new and improved fiber production, compression, and digital signal 
processing techniques, to name a few. 
64 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See Douglas Sicker and Martin Weiss, Cost Issues of AIN-based Local Number Portability Solutions, 
6th Intn’l. Telecommunication Systems Performance and Modeling Conference, Vanderbilt University 
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¶32 Thus, the introduction of the SS7 and the IN profoundly impacted the location of 
services and functions.  Part of the call control that traditionally existed within the switch 
was off-loaded to an SS7 component within the network referred to as a Service 
Signaling Point (“SSP”).68  As depicted above, this SSP would communicate with other 
SSPs (associated with other switches) through Signal Transfer Points (“STPs”).69  The 
STP combined high-rate routing with some basic translation services.  Additionally, the 
introduction of the IN extended the SS7 to provide such capabilities as database lookup, 
announcements and credit card verification through a Service Control Point (“SCP”).70  
Where intelligence was once housed substantially within the local switch, the SS7 and the 
IN operated on a packet-based network to allow for the introduction of profitable services 
outside of the local switch. 
¶33 Another fundamental network design change occurred with the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.71  The Act obligated the incumbent local exchange 
carrier (“ILEC”) to provide a variety of means whereby competitive local exchange 
carriers (“CLECs”) could gain access to facilities or services associated with the ILEC’s 
access network.72  The most notable of these obligations is the availability of the 
unbundled network element (“UNE”).  UNEs are defined as “a facility or equipment used 
in the provision of a telecommunications service . . . includ[ing] features, functions, and 
capabilities that are provided by means of such facilities or equipment, including 
subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing 
and collection or used in the transmission, routing or other provision of a 
telecommunications service.”73  UNEs initially included local loops, local and tandem 
switches (including all vertical switching features provided by the switches), interoffice 
transmission facilities, network interface devices, signaling and call-related databases 
facilities, operations support systems functions, and operator and directory assistance 
facilities.74 
¶34 The Act allowed for the unbundling of the local telephone network75 with the intent 
that competitors gain access to facilities without which they would be “impaired” 
operationally or economically, or where an element was “necessary,” when considering 
alternative elements outside an ILEC’s network, lack of access to that element would 
preclude a carrier from providing a particular service.76  The FCC subsequently 
interpreted this to include the features, functions and capabilities used in the provision of 
a telecommunications service.77  This included physical elements such as the loop or 
 
(1998) [hereinafter Sicker and Weiss]. 
68 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
69 An SSP is a signaling component in the SS7 that originates, modifies and terminates the calls.  They 
are associated with a telephone switch and contain the software and connections necessary to communicate 
with other SS7 components.  An STP provides the routing of signaling requests among SSPs and SCPs.  An 
SCP provides a database function necessary for call processing, such as number translations. 
70 See Sicker and Weiss, supra note 67, at 70-10. 
71 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
72 See id. at § 251. 
73 47 U.S.C. § 153(29) (2005). 
74 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First 
Report & Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499 (1996). 
75 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2005). 
76 See id. at (d)(2)(A)-(B). 
77 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (CC 
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subloop, and logical features such as operator services.  Various rulings have changed the 
original set of UNEs to include (1) the loop and subloop;78 (2) transport;79 (3) switching;80 
(4) signaling networks;81 (5) call-related databases;82 (6) OSS functions;83 and (7) 
Enhanced Extended Links (EELS).84 
¶35 It is notable that New York, a progressive state in the communications arena, had 
been developing unbundling plans prior to federal development of UNEs.  However, 
although UNEs had beginnings within a few progressive states, the fact that UNEs were 
adopted nation-wide under a federal initiative has led to a national (non-local) 
implementation; whereas UNE adoption on a state-by-state initiative would have 
potentially led to localization of policy and technology.  As described by Weiser, “[i]n 
this instance cooperative federalism was effectively realized with the states, New York in 
this case, acting as a laboratory and the federal government stepping in with a cohesive 
national directive.”85  Management of this plan in fifty-one different ways by the states 
and the District of Columbia would lead to inconsistencies that could very well thwart the 
implementation and intended effects of the plan, frustrating the efforts of the intended 
beneficiaries, the CLECs, and ultimately consumers. 
¶36 Several UNEs have been deleted from the list because they no longer meet the 
“necessary and impair” standard,86 e.g., operator, database and directory services.  When 
we look at the nature of these elements, we see that some of these services do not exist at 
the local switch.  For example, operator services can be (and are) provided from remote 
locations in the network.  The non-local nature of these services explains, in part, why 
they do not meet the ‘necessary and impair’ standard, in that such services can be 
provided elsewhere in the network by the competitor.  Since these services can now be 
obtained by a provider other than the incumbent, it pushes them away from meeting the 
“necessary” standard.87  It is also worth pointing out that some of these elements (e.g., 
 
Docket No. 96-98) (August 21, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation]. 
78 In particular, mass market loops, e.g., stand-alone copper loop, including x-DSL capable copper loop; 
narrowband/voice grade portion of FTTH loops only if copper loop is retired due to overbuild; hybrid loops 
(narrowband/non-packetized/voice-grade portion only or copper loop alternative); enterprise market loops 
(dark fiber loops, DS1 loops and some DS3 loops); subloops for multi-unit premises access; and inside wire 
subloops and NIDS.  See id. 
79 Specifically, dedicated transport—dark fiber, DS3, DS1 and shared transport—if state determined. 
See id. 
80 Note, UNE-P only for mass market.  See id. 
81 Note, only if purchasing signaling as a UNE. See id. 
82 Note, only 911 and E911 databases unless unbundled switching is purchased. See id. 
83 Specifically, pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, billing functions, and loop 
qualification information. See id. 
84 See Implemention, supra note 77. 
85 See Weiser, supra note 11. 
86 For a more detailed treatment of the “necessary and impair” standard, see Michael T. Osborne, The 
Unfinished Business of Breaking Up “Ma Bell:” Implementing Local Telephone Corporation in the 
Twenty-first Century, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (Fall 2000). 
87 It may be that the Iowa Utilities Board decision led to the proliferation of these services being offered 
within the network, as the court ruled that, “[t]he FCC cannot, consistent with the statute, blind itself to the 
availability of elements outside the incumbent’s network. In addition, the FCC’s assumption that any 
increase in cost (or decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a network element renders access to that 
element ‘necessary,’ and causes the failure to provide that element to ‘impair’ the entrant’s ability to 
furnish its desired services . . .”  AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). This may have 
spurred alternative providers to create these services within the network, knowing that CLECs would have 
to look to them as a provider, and not solely rely on the FCC to give them blanket access to the ILEC’s 
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directory services) are following the same path of delocalization as the network is in 
general. 
¶37 In a recent D.C. Circuit decision, the court was quite clear on federal delegation to 
state agencies.88  The decision states, “We vacate the Commission’s subdelegation to 
state commissions of decision-making authority over impairment determinations, which 
in the context of this Order applies to the subdelegation scheme established for mass 
market switching and certain dedicated transport elements (DS1, DS3, and dark fiber).”89  
With this decision, the court flatly removed state commissions of the decision-making 
authority on UNE issues as defined in the FCC Triennial Review Order.90 
¶38 The creation of UNEs modularized and delocalized the network by segmenting 
portions of the network and by parsing out service functions to make them available to 
competitive providers.91  UNE creation has had a secondary effect of further 
delocalization by pushing some offered services outside the local office, within the 
network by alternative providers (non-ILECs). 
¶39 At the same time, several forces seem to be driving the reluctance of incumbent 
phone companies to invest in new technology.  First, the constant introduction of new 
technology creates an environment with short technology life spans. This short 
technology life span is well recognized with personal computers, where consumers 
commonly replace their computers every two to four years.  This same phenomenon now 
exists (or will soon) in the telecommunications world, where new access technology, 
such as new generations of digital subscriber line (“DSL”), emerges every three to five 
years.  For companies, this means continuously making costly investment decisions in an 
attempt to track this change, possibly replacing existing technology too soon to recoup a 
return on that investment.  However, the incumbent may be reluctant to invest in high-
cost technology that must be shared with its competitors.92 
 
 
Figure 5.  An example of IP-based long-distance bypass 
 
UNEs. 
88 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. 2004). 
89 Id. at 594. 
90 See id. at 568. 
91 Future work will examine the costs of UNEs, including the cost of the loop, switching, signaling and 
databases. 
92 See U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 424 (D.C. 2002) (stating, “[i]f parties who have not 
shared the risks are able to come in as equal partners on the successes, and avoid payment for the losers, the 
incentive to invest plainly declines”). 
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¶40 Another substantial network change arrived with the introduction of long-distance 
bypass through the use of IP based networks.  In this model, customers would place a 
local call to a local telephone number, which would terminate on an IP gateway.  This 
ingress gateway would make use of the carrier’s IP-based network to carry the call to a 
gateway local to the called customer.  This gateway would then complete a local call to 
the called customer.  Partial motivation for this technology change was the ability of the 
carrier to bypass access charges.  In this situation, seemingly local calls are actually not 
local, making jurisdictional tracking difficult and local regulation less logical.93  As I will 
discuss, while this arbitrage-based use of new technology is a theme that continues with 
us today, it should be realized that bypass and arbitrage are not new concepts.  Arguably, 
PBX, private line and enhanced service provider models all “exploited” regulation.94  In 
other words, it amounted to regulatory arbitrage. For example, enhanced service 
providers such as Tymnet and Compuserve offered public packet-switched services, such 
as electronic mail and content, before the public had access to the Internet.  The 
Enhanced Service Exemption arose in the context of whether a dial-up connection to a 
packet network (e.g., to Tymnet) was an exchange call or an exchange access (long-
distance) call.95  The enhanced service providers designed their networks so that users 
could make local calls to gain access to the enhanced service provider’s network and 
thereby avoid exchange access.  This exemption – and hence avoidance of access 
charges—formed the basis for much of the subsequent policy regarding access to the 
Internet. 
A. Traffic and Cost Characteristics the Present Telephone Network 
¶41 Above, we discussed a number of technology and regulatory influences on the 
design and operation of the network.  All of these influences have had an impact on the 
traffic and cost characteristics of the present network.  With this said, traffic in long-
distance and local calls continued to increase at significant rates as prices continued to 
drop.  The same cycle of more efficient technology, increased competition and increased 
volume continues to fuel these decreasing prices.96 
 
93 This type of bypass also offered cost savings, in that lower quality (and cost) facilities could be used 
to transport the traffic. 
94 There were also cases where long distance carriers used regular flat rate lines to avoid payment; this 
is similar to recent accusations against some long distance carriers. 
95 In re Amendment of Section 64,702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Final Decision, 77 
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), reconsidered, Mem. Op. and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), and further 
reconsidered, Mem. Op. and Order on Further Recons., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), and aff’d, Computer and 
Communications Indus. Ass’n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 
(1983) [hereinafter Computer II Order].  The Computer II Order distinguished between “basic” and 
“enhanced” services.  It defined basic services as “pure transmission capability over a communications path 
that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied information,” and enhanced 
services as “any offering over the telecommunications network, which is more than a basic transmission 
service.”  Id. at 420, para. 96.  It further found that it has jurisdiction over enhanced services, but would 
forbear from regulating them.  See id. at 428, para. 114.  Thus, a dial-up connection to a packet network 
would fall under enhanced service and would not be regulated. 
96 Other factors such as regulatory arbitrage have also influenced this price/demand curve; however, 
such factors account for a minor part of the total traffic. 
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B. Implications of the Modern PSTN 
¶42 Unlike the stable, slow technology change of the traditional telephone network, the 
present telephone network is changing in a much more rapid and less predictable manner.  
This is being driven by the introduction of new technologies, the competitive pressure to 
deploy this new technology, and the need for faster depreciation rates on existing 
technology.  An implication of this change is that providers must be able to readily 
upgrade their networks as technology advances.  A regulatory model that creates 
inconsistencies in how a carrier must deploy its network based on innumerable local 
requirements will hamper the ability of the carrier to rapidly deploy new technology. 
¶43 For example, let us assume that a national carrier decides to deploy a new IP-based 
voice service that implements a particular design strategy.  If one state allows this 
implementation and another does not, it creates a migration and deployment dilemma for 
the carrier.  For economic efficiency, a carrier would want to deploy a single technology 
nationally, or across a broad region, but this deployment could be hampered if the 
technology must go through fifty-one separate compliance reviews.  Although the best 
technical solution may emerge from different regulatory experiments in different states, 
we must recognize the benefits of uniformity and move toward a cooperative federalism 
model where a federal directive emerges to create a uniform environment.97  In other 
words, while it may be advantageous to allow states to serve as regulatory laboratories, 
the federal government must ensure that a uniform environment emerges that supports 
rapid technology adoption and deployment.98 
¶44 The last decade has been marked by a significant increase in the traffic of both 
local and long-distance calling, with the most marked increase in long-distance calling.  
Further, the network has continued to delocalize through the heavy deployment of 
various new technologies: SS7 has shifted control away from the local switch into the 
network; IN has allowed profitable service provisioning outside the local switch, within 
the network; and UNEs have segmented portions of the network, parsed out service 
functions and secondarily pushed services to be offered outside the local office, from 
within the network 
IV. THE INTERNET 
¶45 One might think of the design philosophy of the Internet as the inverse of the 
PSTN.  Where the PSTN traditionally places the intelligence in the network, the Internet 
places the intelligence at the end-point.99  This design difference is quite substantial when 
one considers the where, what and how of modern packet services.  While many of the 
characteristics that distinguish the circuit-switched networks from packet-routed 
networks will be addressed, this will not be an exhaustive review.100  Rather, this paper 
 
97 For example, the FCC mandated “digital,” but left the kind of digital up to the companies.  Some 
companies hedged their bets with TDMA, others used CDMA, and out of this “experiment” arose a winner. 
98 See FCC Data, supra note 57. 
99 See Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed and David D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS, 277-288 (Nov. 1984) available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=357402&coll=GUIDE&dl=GUIDE&CFID=39626820&CFTOKEN=
45727541 (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
100 Circuit-switched technology is more typical of the PSTN, while packet-switched technology 
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describes how packet networks are changing the operation of the PSTN, as the PSTN 
increasingly incorporates features of packet networks. 
¶46 As depicted in Figure 6 below, the Internet is based on a design philosophy wherein 
intelligence and control is located at the end points of the network. 
 
 
Figure 6.  A Simplified Representation of the Internet101 
¶47 Unlike the design of the traditional PSTN where intelligence resides at the local 
office or within the network, IP-based networks push the intelligence to the endpoints; 
essentially serving only to route packets among the end points.  It is this type of attribute 
that distinguishes IP-based networks from circuit-switched networks.  For example, IP 
networks are based on routing of packets in a connectionless mode, wherein the data does 
not travel on dedicated paths as in the connection-oriented circuit-switched network. 
¶48 The current Internet also operates on the premise of “best efforts,” meaning that a 
packet may be dropped because of congestion within the network.  This is fundamentally 
different from circuit-switched networks, where the call depends on the intelligence of 
the network to control the connection.  In the PSTN a “dedicated circuit” is established 
by network intelligence and the same route is used exclusively and uninterrupted for the 
entire session, that is, for the duration of the call.  While information is not dropped due 
to congestion in the circuit-switched PSTN, a price is paid in terms of efficiency.102  IP 
networks do not rely as heavily on the network to control the connection of “sessions” as 
is the case in the circuit-switched network establishing dedicated circuits.  Rather, each 
packet is dynamically routed through the network based on information that the packet 
provides to the network.  In a packet network, bandwidth is allocated as needed by the 
packets entering the network, connections are not dedicated and each packet may use 
 
exemplifies the Internet.  This is not to imply that all packet networks are based on the Internet Protocol 
suite. 
101 Adapted from I. Faynberg et al., CONVERGED NETWORKS AND SERVICES (2000) [hereinafter 
Faynberg]; and D. Isenberg, Rise of the Stupid Network, COMPUTER TELEPHONY, at 16-26 (Aug. 1997) 
available at http://www.hyperorg.com/misc/stupidnet.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
102 This is not to imply that packet is always more efficient than circuit switching.  To understand this 
efficiency one would have to consider the trade-off of overheads in each technology (e.g., packet headers 
versus circuit setup and dedicated circuits). 
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different routes although they are part of the same session/transmission.  As described in 
Figure 6, the Internet is based on a “stupid network” concept, where the network provides 
the minimum of functions, specifically transporting packets.103 
¶49 Further, IP networks push the intelligence and applications (e.g., web browsing, 
email or instant messaging) out to the endpoints, whether that is the user’s computer or a 
server somewhere out in the network.104  It is this separation of the application from the 
network and the distribution of control that hastens the delocalization of the network.  If 
applications are separated from the network and performed by endpoint devices, the need 
for intelligence and control to lie within the network core is removed. 
¶50 The packet-based network wreaks havoc upon traditional jurisdictional analysis.  
Whereas with a circuit switched network, a call travels on a dedicated path along a 
foreordained geographic route; a packet-based network observes no such constraints.  
The “best efforts” nature of a packet-based network follows no pre-set pattern of 
hierarchical paths.  For instance, a packet-based communication may or may not observe 
state boundaries, depending on the network conditions of the moment.  Thus an intrastate 
packet-based call may or may not be, in fact, interstate – but the network operator (and 
certainly the regulator) cannot tell in advance.  At most with a packet-based network, one 
can say that a communication may remain intrastate, but not always and not necessarily.  
Traditional state jurisdictional boundaries simply will not be observed in a packet-
switched world. 
¶51 Another characteristic of the Internet, while not inherent in its design, is its growth.  
Internet traffic is still nearly doubling every year and the number of end points continues 
to grow at double-digit rates.105  This growth has implications for technology, innovation, 
economics and policy, the most obvious of which is how to regulate it, or not, so as not to 
retard its growth. 
¶52 Interestingly, some of these differences (between circuit and packet) are what make 
carrying voice over an IP network difficult.  While these difficulties have for the most 
part been resolved, it does raise a fundamental point.  As discussed below, the PSTN 
essentially evolved with one purpose, to carry voice traffic.  The Internet evolved as a 
data network not tied to any one application.  Providing voice service over the Internet in 
a way that emulates our expectations of ‘phone service’ has required the development of 
a variety of new protocols.  However, one should not think of VoIP as recreating 
traditional telephony service.  First, the outcome in terms of design and operations is 
considerably different.  Second, the potential for additional IP-based services far 
outweighs those that could be provided over traditional telephone networks.  It is also 
interesting to consider what is motivating the move toward VoIP.  While some claim 
technical advantage (e.g., lower data rates and increased flexibility), this does not appear 
to be the true initial motivator.  Rather, it appears that cost and regulation (or the lack 
thereof) are more likely the initial motivators.  With this said, I do believe that in the long 
run, VoIP’s true advantages (e.g., integrated networks and flexible service platforms) will 
be what drives its success. 
 
103 See Isenberg, supra note 101, at 16-26. 
104 See Saltzer et al., supra note 99. 
105 See K.G. Coffman & A.M. Odlyzko, Growth of the Internet (Preliminary Version July 6, 2001), 
available at http://www.research.att.com/areas/transport_evolution/oft.internet.growth.pdf (last visited Apr. 
7, 2005). 
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¶53 As stated, in the Internet model, the network does not specify or control the 
services that are provided, as is the case for the traditional phone network.  Rather, this 
control and specification resides in the endpoints.  The Internet model’s relevance to this 
discussion has to do with what this means for locally provided services, i.e., services 
provided by the central office.  Clearly, as service specification and control moves out of 
the network and toward the endpoints, the role of the central office changes.  Specifically, 
it becomes more simplified.  For example, the local switch (or whatever it evolves into) 
might no longer be involved in the call other than to route or transport packets.  This is 
not to imply that the voice service will exist solely at the user’s endpoint.  Rather, it is 
more likely that a variety of models will exist, with various service functions provided 
throughout the network, maintained and controlled in various ways by either the user or 
network provider(s).  Practical operational constraints (for both the user and the network 
provider) as well as profit models will motivate and influence the outcome. 
¶54 In the traditional circuit-switched network, the voice service and the transport 
service coevolved.  Transport was tailored for the movement of voice traffic and the 
assumptions that went into the design of the network were based on the requirements of 
carrying voice.  In the PSTN design, the service was provided and controlled by the local 
switch (in the local exchange office).106  As the network evolved, new service capabilities 
were introduced to the network.  For example, the advent of the IN brought a number of 
new capabilities.  The trend that this represents is the pushing of network intelligence 
deeper into the network, and away from the local switch.  This is quite different than the 
design of the Internet.  Like the PSTN, the Internet model allows intelligence to 
migrate.107  However, in the case of the Internet, the intelligence migrates out of the 
network and into the endpoints, rather than from the central office into the network.  The 
important difference is that the Internet model distributes this functionality to the 
endpoints whereas the IN model pushes it further within the network.108 
¶55 The revolution in telecommunications is being driven by the rapid rate of technical 
innovation and adaptation.  This has led to a significant decrease in costs, which only 
fuels the fires of change.  Policy decisions at the federal level to leave enhanced services 
unregulated opened the door for the rapid and radical development of Internet-based 
services.  The unexpected growth and direction of “all things Internet” shares this 
technical and economic cycle.  As is recognized by a number of commentators, it is 
difficult for regulation to keep pace with the dynamic world of technology and if it tried, 
it would only retard that pace.109  However, the Internet is more than technology — it is 
the adaptive and flexible services, business models and growth that provide the engine for 
a vibrant market.  It is also the opportunity to move away from the long history of 
regulation.  In fact, attributing too much to the technology of Internet Protocols can lead 
to irrational conclusions about why and how it differs from other technology.  For 
example, differing the regulatory treatment of two services that operate in nearly identical 
 
106 See BELL LABORATORIES, INC., supra note 17. 
107 See Saltzer et al., supra note 99. 
108 There were discussions among carriers and regulators regarding an SS7/IN architecture that provided 
more control to the end user (essentially distributing functionality), but this never came to fruition. 
109 See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 24 (Federal Communications 
Commission Office of Plans and Policy, OPP Working Paper No. 31, 1999), at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 5  
 
150 
ways simply because one service runs over a particular technology does not suggest 
sound or rational policy.  Further, it is far from being technology neutral.  Moreover, it 
misses more important issues, such as concern over market power and support of socially 
desirable services (e.g., E911). 
¶56 The fact that voice services defined basic telecommunications points to the narrow 
nature of the technology and policy.  Voice has merely become another application in the 
IP space, and this has caused an appreciable regulatory quandary.  The implications are 
best realized when we consider how the PSTN and the Internet are interconnecting to 
provide voice service.  Initially (and as described earlier in the long distance bypass 
example), the Internet (or an IP-based network) provides an alternate technology (and an 
alternate regulatory) path for the carriage of voice traffic.  However, this simple ‘data 
carriage model’ is evolving to include a much broader set of services (e.g., multimedia 
content) and functions (e.g., user-specified operations), which are at the heart of the 
Internet model.  The consequence of this design, as we will discuss in the next section, is 
that the future networks based on Internet Protocols will provide voice (or more aptly 
communication) services in ways quite different from the PSTN.  While the traditional 
Internet model, as I have just described, may not remain unaltered through this period of 
convergence, it is likely that voice service providers will adopt many aspects of this 
model.110 
¶57 In conclusion, the Internet model is a highly distributed, application independent 
approach to moving or using data.  It does not respect traditional state/federal 
jurisdictional boundaries.  Indeed, the Internet architecture precludes honoring the 
geographical bounds upon which the federalist regulatory approach has been historically 
premised.  Further, as we have discussed, the differences between this approach and the 
approach used within the traditional PSTN are numerous.  While the specific implications 
of Internet design on the future network are still uncertain, it is certain that carriers will 
adopt many aspects of the Internet model.  Further, it is certain that this model will result 
in a continued delocalization of the network. 
V. FUTURE NETWORKS 
¶58 In the future, voice service will be highly distributed, and applications, functions 
and services will exist throughout the network.111  There are a variety of trends emerging 
in the proposed design of future networks.  One that stands out in contradiction to the 
Internet model is the effort by various carriers and vendors to emulate traditional 
telephony service over IP; this emulation includes the use of standard telephones as the 
end device.  This approach is not surprising given that most users are presumably most 
comfortable with this end device.  In these models, call control and services exist within 
the provider’s network and not in the end device.  However, as we will discuss, even 
these models rely on the distributed nature of IP networks in the manner that they will 
 
110 As I will later elaborate, the concept of what constitutes a voice service provider in the future is open 
to debate, just as what constitutes a voice service.  The distribution of the service (and the associated 
service providers) creates a variety of potential service models. 
111 Most all networks are experiencing the transformation toward packet technologies.  As these various 
networks evolve to carry converged traffic (e.g., voice, video and data), an interesting design convergence 
is occurring.  For example, the architectures of cable and telephone networks are beginning to resemble 
each other ever more closely. 
Vol. 3:2] Douglas C. Sicker 
  151 
offer such services.  In fact, one could argue that these models continue the trend of 
delocalization by limiting the intelligence of the customer end point, maintaining 
intelligence within the network.  Unlike the traditional Class 5 switch (the switch that 
exists in the local end office of the PSTN), the emerging Softswitch technology (defined 
and described below) divides the call processing from the call transport in a way that 
supports a highly distributed control model. 
¶59 Protocols that interface the Internet with the PSTN are being used to create Class 4 
and Class 5 replacements.112  This technology, based on Softswitch architectures,113 is the 
next step in the evolution of the circuit-switched network to packet voice networks.  
Some of the early implementations of Softswitches were for the offloading of Internet 
bound dialup traffic.  This implementation grew out of a need to reduce the load on the 
PSTN switches created by the long holding times of Internet users. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Future voice over packet model based on Softswitch 
architecture 
¶60 The evolution of voice services within the modern network provides insight into 
the delocalization of the network.  Again, VoIP describes the use of IP-based networks to 
carry voice conversations.114  In this example, we consider a particular architecture for 
voice over broadband networks.115  It is important to recognize that there are many 
models for carrying voice over IP and that this approach represents only one of many. 
 
112 See Faynberg, supra note 101. 
113 A Softswitch can be thought of as a decomposed and distributed central office switch and generally 
refers to the call logic associated with a call or connection. 
114 Note that IP does not necessary mean the “public” Internet; in fact, a great deal of VoIP is carried 
over “private” IP-based networks.  By private, we mean networks that are not publicly reachable 
(addressable) over the Internet. 
115 See Kende & Sicker, supra note 16. 




Figure 8.  A Future Voice Network116 
¶61 This model does not require an IP-enabled telephone; rather the consumer could 
use either a traditional telephone or an “IP telephone.”  As depicted above, the phone 
would plug into an analog telephone adaptor, which allows the telephone voice and 
signaling to be translated into formats appropriate for IP-based networks.  The 
communications from the telephone pass through the DSL modem/router and onto the 
broadband access segment of the network.  However, rather than terminating at the 
central office on a switch for call processing, the call passes through the DSLAM117 into 
the IP network, where the actual voice service is provided by a number of elements 
including the Call Agent, Media Server and Application Server.  These various servers 
(and the associated service) could be provided by a variety of providers.  The point is 
simply that the voice service now exists in a highly distributed manner with functionality 
spread throughout the network.118 
¶62 The above discussion highlights the difficulty of actually defining what constitutes 
a voice service in a future network.  The service can now be offered in a highly 
distributed manner, wherein the various functions could be cobbled together by the end 
 
116 See NGN Migration Strategies  (2002) (MetaSwitch White Paper), at 
http://www.metaswitch.com/news/whitepapers.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
117 DSLAM, short for Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer, is the network element that serves to 
terminate the modem signals from the user’s DSL device. 
118 The description above is a gross simplification of the operations of such a network and is only 
intended to demonstrate the delocalized nature of future voice services.  In more detailed terms, the call 
continues through the network to an access gateway (AGW).  This gateway provides a variety of functions, 
the first of which may be to ensure that the call is authorized to be on this network.  It also can connect 
calls to other customers on that network.  The AGW connects to the media server, which provides such 
functions as dial tone and message announcements.  Again, these gateways may reside anywhere on the 
network.  Another element to consider is the Signaling Gateway (SG), which might translate between IP-
based signaling and SS7 messages.  The call agent (CA), also called a Media Gateway Controller (MGC), 
provides the call logic and control of the GW(s).  It provides the intelligence that would typically reside in 
the switch.  The CA actually controls the GWs that would interconnect the IP network with the PSTN.  
Finally, the application server provides service logic for specific applications such as voicemail.  The 
application server provides the VoIP network with the ability to quickly add new services to the network.  
See NGN Migration Strategies, supra note 116. 
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user or by a service aggregator.  Access to this service could vary across devices as users 
transition among locations throughout their day (in other words, it is not the access 
device that necessarily dictates the service provider).  Now, the voice service is a number 
of decomposed functions that are assembled in a variety of manners by a variety of 
entities.  The non-local, highly distributed nature of future voice service makes local 
regulation of such a service much less logical. 
A. Traffic and Cost Characteristics 
¶63 Increasing distance and location insensitivity has been a strong trend in telephony 
and data networking.  The cost of transmission (the distance sensitive component) of 
making long-distance calls continually becomes a smaller fraction of the total cost of the 
call.119, 120  Ignoring regulatory compensation obligations, a local and a long-distance call 
incur similar costs.  The recent wave of bundled, flat-rate local and long-distance calling 
plans best reflects this condition.  These plans, which are being offered by both local and 
long-distance providers are usage and distance insensitive. 121, 122  This same model is 
being offered to customers through a broadband VoIP service, the best known of which 
(at present) is the Vonage model.123 
B. Implications of Future Networks 
¶64 The first point to consider is that the networks of the future are already here.  A 
variety of next-generation networks (or service architectures) already exist and providers 
will steadily deploy more of these networks in the near future.  However, there is also a 
huge installed base of traditional telephony, cable and wireless networks that will not go 
away anytime soon.  Rather, these networks will likely evolve toward a variety of new 
packet-based models.  While these models may not necessarily reflect the end-to-end 
aspirations of the Internet, they will certainly alter how services are provided and where 
the intelligence for these services exists. 
¶65 The model of future networks will resemble the layers of the Internet Protocol 
suite, with access and transport layers moving data, a control layer providing session and 
other control, and an application layer providing features, services and applications.  As 
networks evolve, there will be a number of architectural issues to consider.  The first will 
be the location of the service intelligence, which can now reside anywhere in the 
network.  The second is the converged nature of these networks.  Various services and 
applications will ride together over the same access and transport networks.  It is 
important to realize that these trends (in some shape or form) are occurring in all 
networks.  For example, cable and wireless networks are moving toward IP-based 
 
119 Morten Falch, Cost and Demand Characteristics of Telecom Network, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATION HANDBOOK 104 (William H. Melody ed., 1997), available at 
http://www.lirne.net/resources/tr/chapter09.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
120 It could also be reasoned that the cost of access networks is also dropping, particularly when 
considered in terms of bits per second per dollar of new high rate access technology. 
121 For example, Qwest’s “Unlimited Possibilities” and MCI’s “the Neighborhood”. 
122 See Peter Grant & Almar Latour, Once a Minor Player, Service Captures Growing Share of Home, 
Business Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at A1. 
123 Vonage provides a VoIP over broadband service with unlimited local and long distance calling at 
fixed rates (specifically $24.99 in 2005).  See http://www.vonage.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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architectures, and with this transition they are embracing most, if not all, of the 
characteristics discussed previously.124  The third and final issue to consider will be the 
integration of the new systems with the legacy systems.  This last issue raises a number 
of interesting regulatory issues that are, however, outside of the scope of this paper. 
¶66 As previously described, the design of future voice services is becoming 
increasingly more distributed and delocalized.  One of the most relevant of these 
architectural changes is the decomposition of the telephone switch and the subsequent 
distribution of these functions throughout the network.  The functions and services (e.g., 
call control, features, and functions) no longer need to be provided at the central office as 
they were in the traditional PSTN.  Rather, services will exist as applications provided 
within the network.  Indeed a single service such as voice becomes highly distributed 
with various aspects potentially provided by multiple providers.  The consequence of 
these trends goes to the thesis of this paper; the delocalization of the networks and 
services demonstrates the need to move away from local regulatory jurisdiction. 
¶67 The penultimate consideration is whether consumers will be better off, but an 
underlying issue is whether regulation will interfere negatively with the technical 
development of future networks.  Below, this issue is examined on two levels —state 
actions and general regulatory or deregulatory directions. 
VI. TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES 
¶68 This paper considers a number of well-recognized technology trends that are 
influencing the evolution of the network.  Of these trends, six are particularly pertinent to 
the thesis of this paper. 
 
• The first is that the cost of a call is becoming even more insensitive to the distance of 
that call. 
• The second is the increasing modularity of the network. 
• The third is the shift from circuit-switched networking to packet-routed networks. 
• The fourth is the separation and independence of the application (voice) from the 
network. 
• The fifth is the irrelevance of geographic boundaries for emerging technology. 
• The sixth and final trend is the movement of intelligence and function away from the 
central office, or the delocalization of the central office. 
 
¶69 These trends then end up with the central office of the future being little more than 
a node that connects users to the core of the network and through that core to services 
existing throughout the network. 
A. Trends 
1. Distance insensitive cost 
¶70 The ever-decreasing impact of distance on the cost of the call cannot be overstated.  
The cost of transmission continues to become less of the total cost. The cost percentage 
 
124 See, e.g., http://www.packetcable.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
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that is attributed to distance in a telephone call has lost all practical economic relevance 
in a modern communications network.  Accordingly, the network architecture no longer 
needs to be optimized on distance, as was the case with the traditional hierarchical design 
of the PSTN.  This distance insensitivity has consequently led to a network design that is 
less hierarchical. 
2. Modularity 
¶71 The divestiture of the Bell System and the Carterfone decision began a trend 
wherein the network became more divided and segmented and subsequently more 
modular.  By modularity, I mean that the network was broken down into components and 
segments, allowing devices and services to be obtained from numerous providers.  This 
modularity has continued through various technical and policy advancements with the 
introduction of IP technology being the most recent.  However, these modules do not fit 
well within geographic boundaries because functions and services may now exist 
anywhere in the network. 
3. Network digitization and packetization 
¶72 The PSTN has been moving toward digital and packet technology for decades.  In 
fact, the core network is based on some type of digital and/or packet technology.  More 
recently, we have seen the introduction of digital and packet technologies into the local 
loop in the form of various Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) technologies.  These 
technologies will push the packet nature of the network out to the customer’s device, 
which will usher new architectures and services into the PSTN network, locating more 
control and intelligence outside the local office.  The routing functions of 
communications will likewise become more difficult to trace and will not necessarily 
follow state boundaries. 
4. Independence of the application 
¶73 The trend of separating the application from the network is well understood within 
the technical community and this separation forms the basis of how applications are 
developed within the Internet community.  The result of this separation is that the control 
and intelligence of an application can reside entirely on the end device, with no 
dependence on the network other than to transport bits between sender and receiver.  This 
design approach also allows functions traditionally deployed within the network to 
migrate to the endpoint, a trend that is paralleled by the migration of applications, thus 
control and intelligence, from the PSTN local office into the network — delocalization of 
telephony. 
5. Blurring of network boundaries 
¶74 Eli Noam has described how transmission, switching and networks are blurring the 
relevance of state borders.125  This delocalization distinctly applies to switching and to 
call control.  Consider soft switch architectures, where the control and services exist not 
 
125 See Teske, supra note 2. 
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at the central office but at various points in the network, and where calls are readily 
moved onto private networks.  It has been common (predating the Internet) for a 
company to route calls over its private network with no deference to state or national 
borders.  It is also known that carriers are routing traffic over longer distances to avoid 
intrastate settlement charges.126  Arguably, this type of arbitrage is what voice over the 
Internet has mirrored.  Returning to the VoIP model, software services that control or aid 
your call setup could exist far from the origin of the call (unlike traditional telephony 
where the call was controlled from the local central office).  In such a model, there is 
little meaning to geographic boundaries, e.g., LATAs and state borders.  Further, in order 
to avoid certain regulatory obligations a service provider may purposely move 
components of their network into other states or countries. 
6. Central office delocalized 
¶75 The final trend to consider is the movement of intelligence and function away from 
the central office, the delocalization of the central office.  One might argue that this 
movement is actually the consequence of the aforementioned trends, which allow the 
function and intelligence to migrate.  Regardless, most carriers are in the process of 
delocalizing, with softswitch deployment being a prime example.  It should be mentioned 
that there are other versions of VoIP emerging, which also remove the traditional notion 
of the central office.  For example, the recent peer-to-peer Skype service allows end users 
to communicate directly with each other over the Internet.127 Another service is Free 
World Dialup, a SIP-based128 VoIP service that has a substantial number of subscribers.129 
B. Consequences 
¶76 An interesting consequence of these trends is the difficulty of defining what 
constitutes future voice services and voice service providers.  The service is becoming an 
increasingly more decomposed and distributed gathering of functions and services 
potentially provided by numerous entities.  In terms of operation, design and function, 
this barely resembles traditional PSTN voice service. 
¶77 At this point, it should be rather clear that technical trends are eroding jurisdictional 
distinctions at all levels.  Policymakers who ignore these trends could regulate and 
unwittingly cut across the evolution of this technology.  Misguided or misapplied 
regulatory mandates could stop innovative service providers, influence or impede 
network efficiency, or add to the costs for consumers with no concomitant benefit.130  For 
example, regulating voice over broadband service as a traditional telecommunications 
service with the concurrent obligations, rather than as a data service, would force costly 
 
126 Various carriers are accusing one another of routing calls in a manner that avoids intrastate 
settlements.  See Dennis K. Berman et al., Telecom Tangle, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2003, at B1. 
127 See http://www.skype.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
128 Session Initiation Protocol allows for users to directly (or with minimal network assistance) connect 
with each other over the Internet to establish a session or “call.” 
129 These VoIP services differ significantly in various aspects of design and service.  For more detail, 
see http://www.pulver.com/fwd and http://www.vonage.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2005). 
130 It could be argued that small-scale regulatory failures at the state level have limited impact while 
providing valuable experience without jeopardizing the entire network.  However, this ignores the longer-
term problems that might arise with a variety of differing state requirements. 
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telecommunications obligations such as access charges, taxation and other contributions 
onto a fledgling technology.131  When adding these costly regulatory obligations to high 
initial investment costs it may not be profitable enough to continue offering the service.  
Thus an innovative service would be lost and an alternative provider eliminated.132  Such 
changes could have the additional effect of impeding network efficiency.  For example, it 
may be the case that a more efficient future network shifts voice traffic to voice over 
broadband (i.e., packet-based voice). Lastly, there may not be a benefit to consumers in 
saddling a start-up, non-traditional provider with traditional telecommunications service 
obligations in that their portion of the contributions to the regulatory obligations as a 
whole would be a small portion of the total.  Further, it may force the new provider to 
increase the cost of its service to the point that it could not motivate consumers to switch 
to the new service, or force the provider to decrease its revenues to the point that this 
model would not produce enough profit.  Thus, misunderstanding the consequence of 
these trends could potentially have a profound impact on the development of technology. 
¶78 While this paper takes a strong position on the impact of delocalization on the 
future of the network, it is important to consider where the delocalization trend may not 
apply as strongly.  For example, emergency services (i.e., 911) require the explicit ability 
to contact a local emergency service responder.  In other words, the responder cannot 
exist far from the caller for reasons such as proximity for quick response and familiarity 
with the locale.  It would appear that this issue may well remain under the control (or 
guidance) of the local or state government, simply for reasons of geography.  Other issues 
that would best be served by state or local governments include rights-of-way, consumer 
protection, and licensing.  While this is a small paragraph in a rather large paper, this 
point should not be dismissed without a through analysis of what might best be served by 
the states. 
1. Jurisdictional Issues 
¶79 Few functions viewed as local (including some unbundled network elements) are 
unambiguously local any more.133  For example, the same facilities are used for accessing 
local as well as national and international services.  However, what is now occurring is a 
clear trend to migrate the services and functions that ride on these facilities.  This trend 
continues to erode the traditional local nature of telephony service.  Further, usage trends 
continue to reflect increasingly more non-local (long-distance) use.  These phenomena 
continue to evolve over time in a manner that renders the traditional interstate/intrastate 
 
131 This is not to imply that all such obligations are undesirable.  However, regulators need to investigate 
the transition to VoIP with a close eye on which obligations should remain, which should change and 
which should be removed.  It could be logically argued that the exemption of VoIP from access charges 
would have to go in tandem with other deregulatory action. 
132 Although outside of the scope of this work, such developments could raise interesting antitrust 
issues. 
133 The only element that is tangibly tied to being local is the loop (with the possible inclusion of 
transport).  The local loop facilities remain as the one item that maintains this local nature, merely by the 
fact that it is tied to the local area by a physical presence.  Nonetheless, there are numerous arguments that 
suggest the local/non-local nature of these facilities; this includes the fact that these facilities are used for 
communications that are outside of the local area (e.g., traditional long distance and access to the Internet).  
However, clearly, control over the local loop still has significant implications, particularly when market 
power is considered. 
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(and interLATA/intraLATA) jurisdictional distinction less applicable.  Beyond the 
technical difficulties associated with promoting a localized policy agenda, there are 
numerous non-technical concerns.  Take, for example, the national scope of network 
operations and planning that most major telecommunications companies wish to 
undertake.  These companies could be forced to implement numerous disparate network 
designs depending on the desire of each state, leading to longer deployment times 
(slowing technological advance) and increased costs, and therefore less incentive to 
deploy new technology. 
2. Policy 
¶80 In contemplating telecommunications policy, market, economic, technical, and 
policy issues must be considered in unison, recognizing the unique characteristics of 
each.  A market evolves and is defined by the players in that market.  The network 
evolves and is defined by its technology.  Policy evolves and is defined by the regulation 
(or lack thereof). 
¶81 These elements all evolve, but technology evolves the fastest and in the most 
unpredictable manner.  As such, there are certain benefits to moving towards a 
deregulated regime.  Noll argues that federal and state regulators are in conflict over the 
issue of deregulation.134  He states that whereas a state regulator’s motivation is to 
maintain low local telephony rates through subsidies, federal regulators have a statutory 
mandate to introduce competition and eliminate those subsidies.  While this might be 
viewed as an oversimplification of motivations, it seems prudent to rely on federal 
regulators to continue to lead the policy directive of deregulating the network and the 
services that ride on these networks. 
¶82 Further, deregulation should continue to be a goal for all regulators.  While there 
may be benefits in the states serving as regulatory laboratories, the federal government 
should have a vigilant deregulatory posture.  That said, complete deregulation is 
politically and logically impossible, as the market simply does not serve certain societal 
goals such as universal service subsidies, E911 and consumer interests.135  This is not 
meant to imply that the states will not serve as laboratories, nor that they should have no 
say in the regulatory process, but that they should focus on matters that are of a local 
nature.  Where applicable, the federal government should provide strong guidance, but 
then allow the states to resolve their local issues themselves. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶83 In this paper, I have examined the evolution of communications networks with a 
particular focus on design, operations, traffic and cost.  The consequence of these 
observations is that jurisdictional separation becomes increasingly dubious, particularly 
as services are increasingly no longer provided locally. 
 
134 See Teske, supra note 2. 
135 This is not meant to imply that the states have not served well as laboratories in the past, nor that 
they should have no say in the regulatory process, but that they should focus on matters that are of a local 
nature.  As this paper illustrates, those local matters are becoming a smaller and smaller part of the 
communications landscape. 
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¶84 As a result of these trends and observations, I see two high-level policy 
implications emerging as sensible choices given the technical evolution previously 
described.  The first is the need for a more uniform national policy.136  The second is the 
need to more actively pursue deregulatory policies. 
¶85 As the network becomes increasingly more distance and location insensitive and 
services are more highly distributed throughout the network, local policies could 
hamstring the deployment of new technology.  As voice becomes a more generalized 
network service, we should seek a more generalized and uniform policy. Several 
motivations favor a national deregulatory position as the best choice considering the 
technical evolution I have just described.  First, the federal government currently has the 
mandate and momentum to deregulate.  Second, technology trends are rapid, while 
government policy and the law are slow to change.  Third, the technology is becoming 
more distributed and this distribution does not follow geographically imposed boundaries 
or jurisdictional claims.  Clearly, certain regulatory decisions should remain at the local 
or state level; however, the federal government should serve to guide this process.  What 
needs to be realized is that the services that ride on these networks no longer have the 
same local significance or characteristics. 
¶86 Modern communications networks have evolved in diverse and distinct 
environments, as reflected by the diverse and distinct regulatory, economic and technical 
influences exerted on these networks.  These influences have had profound impact on the 
subsequent development.  As technology continues to evolve in ways that eradicate the 
distinctions between local and non-local communications, so should the policy.  This 
paper demonstrates that, from a technological perspective, the historical rationales for 
state versus federal distinctions are less valid today than they were for the traditional 
PSTN, and that traditional notions of jurisdiction could inhibit the emergence and 
adoption of new technology. 
 
136 Again, some might extend this argument to indicate a need for uniform international policy. 
